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BOOK REVIEWS
Equality in Profession Versus Equality in Belief
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY. By Richard Kluger. New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976. Pp. x, 823. Illustrations, Appendices,
Select Bibliography, Index of Principal Cases, Index. $15.95.
Reviewed by Paul L. Murphy*
Richard Kluger is a novelist and editor who retired to devote
his full time to an extensive study of the landmark Supreme Court
decision of Brown v. Board of Education.' Perceiving the Brown
decision as a watershed with respect to America's willingness to
confront the consequences of centuries of racial discrimination,
Kluger set out to tell the entire story of the Brown decision. Kluger
approaches the Brown case not as a study of the law and its permutations, but as a study of "how law and men interact, how social
forces of the past collide with those of the present, and how the men
selected as America's ultimate arbiters of justice have chosen to
define that quality with widely varying regard for the emotional
content of life itself."'
Specifically, Kluger set out to examine fully all published and
unpublished documentary sources on the case. He interviewed every
living person involved in any way with the case. 3 He then weaves
this material into a readable and dramatic chronicle of every conceivable consideration going into the Court's decision. The work is
painstakingly detailed. It entails the careers of all the principal
figures in the case, including the judges and lawyers in both the
lower court decisions and the Supreme Court cases. The work particularly focuses on the legal strategies and techniques used to address the racial issue, the involved courtroom scenes and confrontations that took place, and the final ruling that emerged, which in
Mr. Kluger's mind brought to a successful conclusion black America's long struggle for equality.
* Professor of History, University of Minnesota. B.A., The College of Idaho, 1947; M.A.,
1948, Ph.D., 1953, The University of California, Berkeley.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2.

R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE at x (1976) [hereinafter cited as KLUGER].

3. Kluger appends an extensive list of the interviews and correspondence on which he
relied. Id. at 796-802.
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In order to dramatize the Supreme Court's reconciliation of the
nation's law with the basic ideal of equality, Kluger devotes the first
quarter of his volume to an exploration of classical developments in
the legal history of race relations in America. He begins with the
transportation of slaves to the new world and traces the failure of
the nation, particularly its courts, to live up to traditional commitments to equal justice under law. Kluger handles this material as a
story, moving from landmark to landmark. The cases and examples
that the author chooses to compose this narrative enable him, by
setting the Brown case in a limited historical context, to depict the
Court's sharp departure from traditional American practice. The
result is the fullest and richest treatment of the Brown decision to
date. While much has been written on the case, no other author has
attempted the breadth of Kluger's presentation.
In some ways, however, the work is peculiarly naive and
strangely two-dimensional. Missing from the book is the broader
setting of ingrained American values, for example, the conflict between liberty and equality, which so fascinated de Tocqueville in
the 19th century, their evolution, and their development through
time. Brown was attempting to assail and ultimately to alter these
traditional values. Had Mr. Kluger explored more carefully the doctrine of equality and America's attitude toward that doctrine, much
of the "happy ending" quality of his story might have been tempered. Central to a full and sophisticated understanding of the
Brown decision is the dilemma of equality as a conceptual value and
the dichotomized role it has played historically in the American
mind.
The major problem that Richard Kluger fails to confront candidly in his chronicle of the Brown decision turns on the unwillingness of modem America to embrace a substantive concept of racial
equality. While acknowledging the Supreme Court's reluctance to
advance Negro rights beyond a line judged not to be intrusive on
white sensibilities, 4 Kluger does not explore carefully the prevailing
national attitude toward political and social equality at the time of
the Brown case. Thus Kluger fails to recognize the critical distinction between the American perception of equality as a doctrine and
the actualization of that doctrine in its social institutions.
In his unfortunately brief, and somewhat starry eyed epilogue,
Mr. Kluger examines some of the persistent problems of noncompliance with school desegregation orders. While Kluger recognizes the
4. Id. at 589. See also Lefberg, ChiefJustice Vinson and the Politics of Desegregation,
24 EMORY L.J. 243 (1975).
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positive strides taken with respect to integration, 5 he cites Marshall's dissent in the 1974 Detroit busing case, Milliken v. Bradley,'
for the proposition that the perceived public mood of the nation
should not impede the constitutional guarantee of equal justice.
Kluger identifies the fears of the white middle class American
and understands his resentment of the federal courts' attempts to
enforce their perception of social and political equality. Mr. Kluger
argues that because the public behavior of a majority of Americans
toward nonthreatening forms of temporary social accommodation
does not produce a violent response, there is a general acceptance
of doctrinal equality or, at the very least, equality under the law.
Yet one simply cannot make this general conclusion solely from
sporadic examples of social behavior. Clearly the attitude of such
Americans on the larger issue of inherent black inequality has not
changed, despite a more benign acceptance of minimal black
rights.' At this point, Mr. Kluger could have explored more carefully
the Warren Court's misjudgment of public attitudes toward the
doctrine of equality. Operating under the idealistic assumption that
the Court's role in the twentieth century was to find legal ways to
harmonize historically professed American ideals and their practice,
the Warren Court failed to perceive the disillusioning reality that
millions of Americans preferred to maintain a discrepancy between
theory and practice. On the one hand, the American people profess
their belief in such abstract concepts as freedom, liberty, and equality, and on the other hand, they abstain from implementing these
precepts into action.'
Clearly a majority of Americans in 1954 did not embrace the
idea of legally coercing social and political equality in order to guarantee the rights of minority groups. Yet Mr. Kluger, just like the
brilliant team of black attorneys who argued the Brown case, cannot
understand that once the Supreme Court went on record as endorsing total legal equality, why the majority of American people cannot
see the logic, value, and virtue of that position.
The poignant irony of the Brown case is that the people who
made the legal decision were powerful, white, establishment figures,
reacting to the carefully evolved, sophisticated legal persuasion of
5.
6.
7.
AFFAIRS

KLUGER, supra note 2, at 774-75.

418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHILOSOPHY & PUB.
3 (1974).

8. A. Cox, THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 1918-1969, at 462-63 (1972).

76-77 (1976); P.
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a group of elite black lawyers. In a sense, the Court said, "All right,
your case is persuasive. We will finally let your people have their
legal rights." Seemingly, the Court was not prepared to acknowledge that despite the presumed magic of such a revolutionary legal
step, people would not live happily ever after in perfect political and
social harmony. Clearly a review of the wisdom of Zecheriah Chafee
and Learned Hand would have been profitable. Chafee, quoting
Professor McBain, wrote, "Legal precepts cannot change human
nature. And the stuff of courts is human stuff." He further observed,
"Nine men in Washington cannot hold a nation to ideals which it
is determined to betray."9 Hand contended that "[1]iberty lies in
the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution,
no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can
even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution,
''0
no law, no court to save it.
In spite of the careful legal development of the Brown case, the
skill of the lawyers involved, the wisdom of the tactics employed,
and the goodwill of the bench hearing the case," Brown v. Board of
Education did not make the majority of Americans believe that
blacks were equal. Thus the important developments in the postBrown years often have reflected attempts by varying groups to
circumvent the Brown decision. For congressional leaders, the executive branch, and the judiciary, the name of the game has become
one of devising public justifications to persuade people to accept the
assumptions of Brown. In response, the name of the game for those
in opposition to school desegregation is massive resistance and noncompliance with the orders of the federal courts.
That attitude has persisted to the present time. It underlies
everything that has occurred in the last twenty-two years in the area
of racial conflict-massive resistance, antibusing activities, and the
disgrace of Jensen-Shockleyism.12 In this respect, Kluger's moving
and exhaustive chronicle could have been much better had the author been more realistic about probing the national stage and the
sentiments and prejudices of the American audience.
Perhaps America's commitment to equality is simply a code
9.

Z.

CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

10.

L.

HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY

11.

C.

JENCKS, INEQUALITY

12.

See N.

at xiv (1942).

190 (2d ed. 1953).

(1972).

DWORKIN, THE I.Q. CONTROVERSY (1976); Block & Dworkin, I.Q.,
Heritabilityand Inequality, 3 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 331 (1973). See generally I. NEWBY,
BLOCK

& G.

CHALLENGE TO THE COURT: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND THE DEFENSE OF SEGREGATION

1954-1966

(1967); Hodgson, Do Schools Make a Difference?, 231 ATLANTIC 35 (1973); Ravitch,
Integration, Segregation, Pluralism,45 AM. SCHOLAR 206 (1976).
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word for affording to minority citizens a slightly more open opportunity to compete in the white man's world on the white man's
terms, and in no way implies the substantial social and political
equality that Brown sought to foment. Even if that is the case, as
this reviewer suspects, Richard Kluger's study is valuable. What the
principal characters in the Brown case did and the immediate legal
success that they attained is essential to an understanding of the
problems that still impede black America's struggle for equality.

The Early American Legal Profession
1776-1876. By Maxwell
Bloomfield. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 1976. Pp. ix, 397. $15.00.
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY,

Reviewed by Richard E. Ellis*
This book has a number of virtues. It is fluently and, at times,
even engagingly written. Its research is wide ranging. It is often
suggestive. It is critical of other interpretations without being pretentious and arrogant. Yet, it is also a book with serious flaws. It
lacks focus and balance, and it fails to elaborate adequately on its
most important points. It frequently offers interpretations that are
confusing and questionable, and, despite the promise of the title, it
does not relate adequately the legal profession to the changing nature of American society in the hundred years after independence.
Much of the problem stems from the book's organization and
content. It is a series of separate essays arranged in roughly chronological order, with no basic common theme or methodological approach to tie them together. The book contains nine chapters, five
of which explicitly embrace the biographical approach and examine
the responses of significant, but little known, judges to a number of
important but disparate events: the Revolution (Peter Van
Schaack), the codification movement (William Sampson), the
changing economic and social system in Ohio (Frederick Grimk6),
the Confederacy (William Pitt Ballinger), and the education and
training of black lawyers (John Mercer Langston). The four remaining chapters deal with antilawyer sentiment in the postrevolutionary period, the development of family law in the midnineteenth century, attempts to upgrade the profession's image,
and urban riot control in Philadelphia in the 1840's. Despite the
disparate nature of the essays, however, each covers important and
interesting aspects of early American legal history and raises a number of significant, if unrelated, questions.
The opening chapter on "Peter Van Schaack and the Problem
of Allegiance" during the American Revolution is a good beginning,
for the subject is an important one rich in its potential for uncovering the nature of the legal profession in 1776. Yet, what follows is
very disappointing. We are given too much biography and not
enough analysis of Van Schaack's legal career. We learn a great deal
*Professor of History, State University of New York, Buffalo, B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1960; M.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1961; Ph.D., 1969.
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about when he was born, where he grew up, whom he married, his
place in the course of the Revolution in New York, his decision to
become a loyalist and the difficulties he suffered as a consequence
of that decision, his experiences in England, and his Federalist politics. But only passing mention is made of his involvement with the
law or the kind of lawyer he was. For example, we learn that he
started to lose his sight in 1772 after he was appointed to revise the
laws of New York, a revision, Bloomfield tells us, that produced "a
masterful synthesis of colonial jurisprudence."' But, in the pages
that follow, the contents of this "masterful synthesis" are never
analyzed, although we are given a running account of his developing
blindness. We are tantalized with the revelation that the bulk of
Van Schaack's practice involved real estate transactions,2 but this
is never elaborated upon, which is unfortunate because there has yet
to be written an adequate account of a real estate practice in the
eighteenth century. Moreover, only passing mention is made of Van
Schaack as a teacher of the law, although that was the area in which
he "exerted his greatest influence as a lawyer. . ... - The purpose

of the chapter-the question of allegiance during the revolutionary
crisis-is boiled down to the narrow and unexciting legalistic arguments that Van Schaack used against specific anti-loyalist legislation that directly affected him, instead of the more meaningful and
broader question of how a lawyer's professional background and
training would influence his decisions during such a crisis.
The second essay on "Antilawyer Sentiment in the Early Republic" is more focused. Building upon the ideas and findings of a
number of other scholars, and particularly those of several recent
unpublished doctoral dissertations, Bloomfield quite satisfactorily
summarizes the present state of scholarship on the subject.' To be
noted particularly is the useful analysis of the contents of Benjamin
Austin's Observations on the PerniciousPractice of the Law (Boston, 1786) and Jesse Higgins' Sampson Against the Philistines
(Philadelphia, 1805) . Also valuable is the stress that Bloomfield
1.

M.

BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY,

[hereinafter cited as

1776-1876, at 5 (1976)

BLOOMFIELD].

2. Id. at 4, 24.
3. Id. at 25.
4. J. Aiken, Utopianism and the Emergence of the Colonial Legal Profession: New York,
1664-1710, a Test Case (1967) (unpublished dissertation in University of Rochester Library);
G. Gawalt, Massachusetts Lawyers, A Historical Analysis of the Process of Professionalization, 1760-1840 (1969) (unpublished dissertation in Clark University Library); C.
McKirdy, Lawyers in Crisis: The Massachusetts Legal Profession, 1760-1790 (1969) (unpublished dissertation in Northwestern University Library).

5.

BLOOMFIELD,

supra note 1, at 45-49.
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places upon the utopian and arcadian roots of the antilawyer attitudes that existed in seventeenth-century America, attitudes that
tended to be overshadowed by the rise of the legal profession in the
eighteenth century as the social and economic life of the colonies
became increasingly complex, but that were reborn with the republican idealism of the Revolution. He blunts the value of this insight,
however, by suggesting that after the Revolution the assault on the
legal profession "represented no Marxist struggles between opposing
economic groups, no risings of the propertyless masses against an
oppressive capitalist order," but rather that the profession's critics
were "sturdy middle-class types" and "thrifty bourgeois."' The
problem here lies in Bloomfield's failure to realize that he is mixing
together two different, and in certain ways, incompatible interpretations. The view stressing the republican idealism of the Revolution recognizes that to a large extent the sources of the hostility to
the legal profession are to be traced back to the religious, economic,
and social values that existed in Europe and America prior to the
advent of capitalism. This concept of what might be termed "moral
economy" saw lawyers as nonproducers, leeches upon society, and
troublemakers. Antilawyer sentiment thus becomes part of the resistance of a tradition-oriented agrarian society to the emergent
values of capitalism and modernization, which began to appear in
America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and
which to a large extent manifested themselves in the values both of
the law and of the legal profession. 7 To argue that opposition to the
legal profession had its roots in middle class discontent, on the other
hand, is to suggest that antilawyer sentiment in the early republic
developed within the context of an already arrived capitalism and
that the critics of the legal profession were, as Bloomfield makes
explicit at one point, mainly "malcontents."" This argument also
reduces the significance of the issues raised by the legal profession's
critics. Both points of view are intertwined in the chapter and both
undoubtedly existed in post-revolutionary America, but no serious
attempt is made to disentangle them, to harmonize them, or, most
importantly, to evaluate their relative importance. As a consequence, Bloomfield merely describes the existence of antilawyer
sentiment in the early republic without ever coming to terms with
its significance for the changes in American society that occurred
6. Id. at 44.
7. R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS:
16, 250-66 (1971).
8. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 1, at 44.

COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 111-
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after independence.
Also debatable is Bloomfield's claim that hostility to the legal
profession was less intense in the South than it was 'in other parts
of the country. The danger here is that Bloomfield may be reading
backwards into the early national period the tensions that caused
the Civil War and the circumstances that made the post-Civil War
South different from the rest of the country. In other words, he does
not perceive that it was the rise of the slavery issue after the 1830's
and the loss of the Civil War that made the South different from
the rest of the country and that in the years after independence the
South was really quite similar to other regions.' To a certain extent,
Bloomfield recognizes this when he observes that "vigorous antilawyer sentiment flourished in . . . North Carolina . . . as well as in
post-revolutionary Georgia."' 10 What then does the author mean by
the South? Presumably, it is Virginia and South Carolina. How
intense or pervasive it was in Virginia is hard to say on the basis of
the existing secondary sources, but there is no doubt that some
antilawyer sentiment did exist in the Old Dominion. For example,
a candidate for the Virginia general assembly in 1800 noted "that
being a lawyer was with some a fatal objection, their taking it for
granted that a lawyer was interested in multiplying the laws and
making them more complex."" The South Carolina situation is
more complicated. A recent study of post-revolutionary legal developments in the state, based mainly on an examination of legislation
actually passed, seems to confirm the view that antilawyer sentiment was not very important in South Carolina. 12 This approach,
unfortunately, looks only at the results of the struggle, that is, the
specific laws passed during the 1780's, and not at the nature of the
struggle that took place over the passage of these laws. Moreover,
it runs counter to the findings of the most recent scholarship on the
years immediately following independence, which strongly indicates
that while the eastern ruling group of planters and lawyers in South
Carolina remained in control throughout the 1776-1787 period, the
demands of the small farmers of the western portion of the state
were becoming both increasingly vociferous and closer to being
achieved. 3 In short, the conditions that created antilawyer senti-

9. Id. at 50-51, 84, 92, 96-97. See also Ely, Book Review, 55 B.U.L. REV. 153 (1975).
10. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 1, at 50.
11. Letter from William Brockenbrough to Joseph Cabell, June 9, 1801, on file in University of Virginia Library.

12. Ely, American Independence and the Law: A Study of Post-RevolutionarySouth
Carolina Legislatures, 26 VAND. L. REV. 939 (1973).
13.

J. MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS:

CRITICS

OF THE CONSTITUTION 21-28 (1961); J. MAIN,
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ment in states such as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania also existed
in South Carolina. This, in itself, of course, does not prove the
actual existence of such sentiment in the Palmetto state, but
strongly suggests that the problem has not been studied adequately
in South Carolina and that much the same divisions that existed in
the New England and Middle Atlantic states also existed in the
South.
Bloomfield next turns his attention to the codification movement by analyzing the career of William Sampson, a colorful Irish
6migr6 lawyer. As in the opening essay on Van Schaack, too much
space is devoted to extraneous biographical detail, and the most
interesting part, an analysis of the codification movement itself, is
too compressed to be really meaningful. The main point of the essay
is to disassociate Sampson's brand of codification, which is viewed
as a movement within the legal profession and not one against it,
from that of the radical followers of Jeremy Bentham.'4 The point
is well taken, for reformers like Sampson were interested in a digest
that would rationalize the law rather than a code that would change
fundamentally the nature of the law as it was evolving. 5 Nevertheless, as Bloomfield is forced to admit, Sampson's rather conservative attempt to reorganize and clarify the law was not the main
thrust of the codification movement, which, as the 1820's and 1830's
wore on, increasingly took on the rhetoric of Jacksonian democracy
with its antilawyer and agrarian overtones. 6 Unfortunately, the relationship between the two movements is not explored adequately
and, as in the preceding essay on "Antilawyer Sentiment in the
Early Republic," the reasons for their development are confused.
Particularly open to question is Bloomfield's assertion that the
kind of codification endorsed by Sampson came from "liberal practitioners with no political axes to grind" who "sought to close the
gap between legal dogmatism and the changing needs of a democratic society."'" In point of fact, the kind of codification endorsed
by Sampson and his friends was highly "political" in its implications, for it was supported by those lawyers who not only were conPOLITICAL PARTIES BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION 269-95 (1973); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 367, 399, 482 (1969). Both Main and Wood use newspapers along with

other sources to obtain this understanding of South Carolina society. Ely does not use any
newspapers.
14. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 1, at 77, 80-81.
15. See G. DARGO, JEFFERSON'S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS
169-70 (1975).
16. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 1, at 84-85.
17.

Id. at 60.
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cerned by the proliferation of law reports, but also by the inconsistency between many of the opinions published by these reports and
the particular doctrines that many members of the legal profession
wanted to see adopted.' 8 This kind of concern was evident in the
years immediately following the panic of 1819, when an intensive
rebirth of precapitalist concepts of moral economy took place and
deeply worried many lawyers who feared popular pressures would
undercut the uses to which the law was being put in order to foster
economic development. Codification, in the form of digests of the
law, if controlled by the right people, offered an opportunity to
eliminate or at least effectively to limit the antidevelopmental doctrines in the form of just price and usury laws, certain kinds of
replevin acts, and debtor legislation that manifested itself in many
states in the 1820's. Failing, however, to maintain their control over
the codification movement, many of its advocates, Joseph Story
being the most notable, began to write legal treatises. In this endeavor, they were more successful, though just how successful is
hard to say, for no adequate study exists of the numerous treatises
written in the second third of the nineteenth century, of the doctrines they stressed and those they de-emphasized, and of their
application by the many judges and lawyers who were overwhelmed
by the numbers of cases reported and were hampered by the difficulties involved in finding copies of the cases when they rode circuit.
As the most articulate spokesman of these groups pushing for the
dominance of market-oriented and capitalist values, these lawyers
hardly can be said to have had "no particular axes to grind," and
their relationship to the democratic process, especially in their surreptitious efforts to undercut the role of legislative bodies in the
lawmaking process, is at best equivocal and in many ways insidious.

20

The fourth essay deals with "The Family in Antebellum Law"
and is the only chapter of the book to treat substantive legal developments. A whole range of topics is covered: marriage and divorce;
relationships between parents and children, masters and servants,
and masters and slaves; the treatment of the elderly, the indigent,
and the poor; and the general status of women and children in
society. The subject is extremely important and has not received the
18.

See, e.g., Letter from Jeremiah Mason to Joseph Story, Jan. 8, 1822, in MEMOIR AND

CORRESPONDENCE OF JEREMIAH MASON 261 (G. Hilliard ed. 1873).
19. R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF AMERICAN LAW 138-72

(1938); C. WARREN, A
508-62 (1911).
See Horowitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251 (1975).

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR

20.
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attention it deserves, even with the recent rebirth of activity in legal
history. It is also a particularly difficult subject to cover well because it is as much social history as it is legal history, and the social
history of America between the Revolution and the Civil War is still
very murky. As a consequence, Bloomfield does not receive much
help from the existing secondary sources, and the ones he does use
frequently have dated and questionable points of view. 21 To be regretted even more is Bloomfield's tendency throughout the chapter
simply to describe the law and a number of important decisions
without ever coming to terms with the various conditions that led
to the creation of certain laws and doctrines and that brought about
changes in them. Never, for example, does Bloomfield confront the
crucial question of the relative importance of economic considerations on the one hand, such as the wide distribution of property, the
dislocation created by the spread of the market economy, and the
increase in mobility brought about by the physical expansion of the
country, and the role of humanitarian and religious impulses on the
other hand, in bringing about alterations in the legal relationships
among individuals in the diffuse areas that he covers under the
rubric of family law.
The following chapter on "Upgrading the Professional Image"
takes issue with the point of view presented by Charles Warren,
Roscoe Pound, and others that the legal profession went into serious
decline during the 1830-1870 period. Bloomfield downplays not only
the significance and the radical nature of persistent antilawyer rhetoric, but also the lamentations of professional deline by elite members of the bar such as Joseph Story and James Kent. Instead, he
stresses the role played by middle class reformers within the legal
profession who responded to what was in many cases the just demands of an ever expanding bourgeoisie for a more efficient system
of justice.2 2 To support his argument, Bloomfield launches into an
extensive examination of contemporary writing, especially law journals and novels, which tended to present the lawyers' role in a
favorable light and to picture them as hard working representatives
of the people in a society becoming increasingly responsive to popular pressures. 3 The argument is well taken. It is a useful counterweight to the Warren-Pound approach and it reflects the growth of
21. Important exceptions are: L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 179-201 (1973);
D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM, SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC
(1971).
22. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 1, at 136-42.
23. Id. at 142-90.
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middle class values in mid-nineteenth century America. It is also
overstated; other problems also exist with this analysis. Much of the
antilawyer rhetoric in the post-1830 period was not middle class, but
continued to have agrarian and precapitalistic overtones. Bloomfield actually recognizes this earlier when he observes that the codification movement involved "damning not only the common law
but the common lawyer as well." 24 Care also must be taken not to
de-emphasize too much the role of elite lawyers like Kent, Story,
and David Hoffman, for their influence continued to be great, especially with the most important members of the legal profession during the Civil War era. In addition, Bloomfield never really confronts
the sticky question of the extent to which the legal profession really
came to think of itself as the servants of the people and the extent
to which it merely opportunely followed the dominant thrust of the
political culture of the second third of the nineteenth century in
which everyone projected the image of a public servant. The problem here is that Bloomfield neither places his argument in its proper
context nor does he effectively explore its implications.
Perhaps the most disappointing essay is the one on "Riot Control in Philadelphia." The actions of "the crowd" or "the mob"
(depending on how you view them) in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries have attracted considerable attention in recent years from
both European and American historians. 25 As a result, very sophisticated questions have been raised about the role of social violence
and its relationship to the legal process. Unfortunately, Bloomfield
does not pick up on any of these insights and instead gives a highly
narrative-indeed annalistic-account of nativistic activities in the
1840's, with occasional references to the pressures that the growth
and changing social makeup of Philadelphia placed on law enforcement problems.
The final three essays on Frederick Grimke, William Pitt Ballinger, and John Mercer Langston, are valuable pieces because they
deal with personalities and problems that generally have been ig24.

Id. at 84.

25. D. HOERDER, PEOPLE AND MOBS: CROWD ACTION IN MASSACHUSETrS DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1765-1780 (1971); P. MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION (1972); G.
RUDE, THE CROWD IN HISTORY (1964); E. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING
CLASS (1963); G. WILLIAMS, ARTISANS AND SANS-CULLOTrES (1969); Grimsted, Rioting in its
Jacksonian Setting, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 361 (1972); Lemisch, The Ridiculism of the
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nored by scholars. It is a poor way to end the volume, however, for
we are never given any kind of overview of what the legal profession
had evolved into by 1876, the closing date given in the title of the
book. Indeed, in addition to its lack of focus, the most serious problem with this book is the author's inability to come to terms with
the very thing he promises to do in the title: to discuss American
lawyers in the context of a changing American society between 1776
and 1876. Although the significance of the first date is obvious, the
meaning of the latter date is unclear. Does it signify the end of
reconstruction? The triumph of big business and the beginning of
the rise of the corporate lawyer? The start of legal formalism? Or
was something else occurring at this time? Despite the existence of
a conclusion, no attempt is made to explain why the book ends when
it does. As a result, the reader is left uncertain both of the book's
purpose and its accomplishments.

The Stratification of the American Bar
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA.

By Jerold S. Auerbach. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Pp. xiii, 395. $13.95.
Reviewed by Sanford Levinson*
Jerold Auerbach, professor of American history at Wellesley
College, has written an extremely valuable, but vexing, study of the
social and political attitudes of America's legal elite during the
twentieth century. Its value lies in Auerbach's demonstration of the
social conservatism, at times sliding over into abject bigotry, that
motivated many venerable leaders of the American Bar. Any image
of the Bar as genuinely committed to meritocracy-the linking of
Bar membership and leadership to attributes other than proper
racial, religious, or social background-must collapse in the face of
the evidence collected by Auerbach. Insofar as one value of historical understanding is simply the chastening of our tendency toward
idealization of the past, Auerbach has performed a real service.
The book is vexing, however, because Auerbach is less clear
than he might be both about the historical background of American
lawyering and about the specific ideological framework within
which he intends his study to be interpreted. His book is justifiably
critical of the actions of the Bar; it is, however, just at the point
when one begins to seek solutions to the problems outlined by Auerbach that certain ambiguities, if not indeed contradictions, appear
in his argument.
I
Auerbach's book embraces the following central thesis: Prior to
the turn of the twentieth century, the American Bar, although
"[s]tratified by education, wealth, power, and style" and divided
into both "aristocratic" and "country lawyer" elements, "nonetheless belonged to one society, one culture, one past. But by 1900,
lawyers no longer could inhabit such a homogeneous national and
professional culture because it no longer existed."' Concerned about
the loss of status facing the Bar, a loss in part generated by the entry
of recent immigrants and other "non-traditional" Americans into
the ranks of lawyers, the organized Bar mobilized against the inter* Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University. B.A., Duke University, 1962;
Ph.D., Harvard University, 1969; J.D., Stanford University, 1973.
1. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 19-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
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lopers in a variety of ways, ranging from changes in codes of ethics
to the creation of much stiffer educational requirements.
As Auerbach points out, the ethical injunctions against solicitation present a severe handicap to obtaining legal business for new
lawyers who are not well-connected socially. A lawyer entering a
Wall Street firm, even though without prior contact with New York
City, has no worries about finding ways to keep himself (and until
the very recent past it was only "him") occupied and paid. A solo
practioner from a socially disfavored background cannot rely on the
"invisible" (because concealed) hand of the social market place to
provide clients. Some self-promotion is necessary, and Auerbach
shows how the denizens of the Bar, almost invariably ensconced in
corporate law firms, moved to make such self-promotion unethical.'
In a striking analysis, Auerbach demonstrates how the Canons of
Ethics represented the transmission of essentially small-town
norms-in which public "reputation" was crucial-to an urban environment. The Canons "presupposed the vanished homogeneous
community whose lawyers were known, visible, and accessible and
whose citizens recognized their own legal problems and knew where
to turn for assistance." The only aspect of urban culture fitting this
framework was the world of the corporate bar, with its "small homogeneous community whose members enjoyed shared values, ease of
communication, and a network of mutually reinforcing educational,
religious, and social ties."'3 Excluded from this cozy small community within the city were all of the poor as well as many non-poor
with unacceptable pedigrees.
Similarly, the move against non-elite law schools in the 1910's
and 1920's, made in the name of upgrading the standards of the Bar,
effectively limited entry into the profession to those who both could
afford the costs and could cross the social hurdles established by
American colleges and universities. Auerbach quotes effectively
from the debates surrounding the 1920 Root Commission report to
the American Bar Association, which called for a two-year college
requirement before one could enter law school. Root was concerned
"by the tens of thousands" of new lawyers who purportedly had no
"conception of the moral qualities that underlie our free American
institutions."'
2.

For a contemporary analysis of the problem see M. FRIEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN

AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 113-25 (1975).
3. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 42.
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Auerbach convincingly depicts the mood of status insecurity
pervading the elite bar and shows that active moves were made to
limit the access of disfavored groups-often, but by no means exclusively, Jews-to membership in the Bar. He also explores the resulting limitation, intended or not, on the access of many ordinary
citizens to lawyers, given the economic and social constraints preventing Mr. Abramowitz of Delancy Street from being represented
by John W. Davis or Elihu Root.
Auerbach is less convincing in his argument that the American
Bar enjoyed traditionally high status threatened only at the turn of
the century by the new entrants from the great unwashed classes.
He seems to accept the notion that American culture historically
had held "popular affection" 5 for lawyers. This is surely a debatable
point, and Auerbach should have placed his particular study more
carefully within the framework of American social and legal history.
Maxwell Bloomfield, in his recent study, American Lawyers in a
Changing Society, shows very clearly that American culture, at
least from the time of independence, featured a great deal of antilawyer sentiment. The comment of citizens of New Braintree, Massachusetts, is typical.
With regard to the Practitioners of the Law in this Commonwealth, daily
experience convinces us of the horrid extortion, tyranny and oppression, practised among that order of men, who, of late years, have amazingly increased
in number, opulance, and grandeur, .

.

. and we think there is much to fear

from so powerful and numerous a body of men as the practitioners of the law
are now become, if they are suffered still to proceed on, without any check or
controul.'

Bloomfield summarizes the results of his research by stating that
"at no time in their history have the American people shown much
disposition to revere their lawyers."' One wonders if the popular
esteem for Lincoln, who is mentioned by Auerbach on several
occasions as exemplary of the "country lawyer," arose because of or
despite the fact that he was a lawyer.
One also would like to see comparisons, for example, of the
Yankee response to the Irish immigration of the 1840's and the
concomitant entry of Irish-Americans into the Bar with the later
response to the Eastern European immigration and entry into the
legal profession. The purpose of such a comparison lies not in lessening our anger at the bigotry revealed by Auerbach's research, but
5. Id. at 15.

6. M.
7.
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rather in evaluating the extent to which such behavior was a recent
development or was typical of persisting social strains in American
life. I confess to being more than a little dubious about Auerbach's
assertion that American society, or even its legal branch, was characterized prior to 1900 by "one culture [and] one past." Bloomfield, for example, notes that nineteenth century Irish lawyers faced
a "vicious caste system."8 Writing of the conservatism of the Boston
Bar, James Banner concluded that "[a]ll in all, the legal community in Massachusetts was able to enforce appreciable conformity upon its members,"9 who themselves were drawn from a select
part of Massachusetts society.
Auerbach, moreover, is ambiguous as to the actual power of his
legal elites in shaping the legal system. Thus, after showing that the
American Bar Association adopted the Root report, he notes that its
call for two years of college and a law degree as prerequisites to the
practice of law was adopted by no state. "Elite lawyers did not
succeed in excluding undesirables-state legislatures were an insurmountable obstacle-but they did maintain professional stratification to correspond to their own ethnic and social preferences."'" The
leadership of the organized Bar undoubtedly was confined to certain
social and religious groups; almost undoubtedly, this had at least
some effect on the shaping of the American polity, insofar as American government always has featured a movement back and forth
between elite law firms and public office. Yet, by his own evidence,
the patterns of American politics were much more variegated than
his simple emphasis on elite dominance would allow. Thus, for example, Woodrow Wilson took on practically the entire leadership of
the American Bar Association in his nomination of Louis Brandeis
to the Supreme Court. Felix Frankfurter earlier had begun his spectacular career as an aide to Henry Stimson. Both examples are
mixed, of course; it was scarcely unimportant that both men had
had remarkable success at Harvard Law School. Neither could be
compared in educational background to the struggling graduate of
a night law school. Nor does mention of Frankfurter and Brandeis
negate the massive evidence brought forth by Auerbach of the antiSemitism that pervaded the highest reaches of the organized Bar,
including its academic branches. (He notes, for example, that Abe
Fortas was excluded from consideration for a faculty position at
8.
9.

Id. at 303.
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Northwestern specifically because he was Jewish.") Nonetheless, it
is essential to remember that the "elites" often did not prevail.
The focus of Auerbach's concern shifts toward the end of his
book from the social and religious discrimination noted above to the
political capitulation of the organized Bar before the "red scare" of
the late 1940's and the 1950's and to the general nonparticipation
in, if not hostility to, the social reform movements of the 1960's.
Castigating the views of men like Learned Hand, Herbert Wechsler,
and Alexander Bickel, he argues that academic lawyers joined in the
move toward conservatism through their exaltation of certain "process" values at the cost of closing their eyes to the social results thus
tolerated. According to Auerbach, "[c]onsensus replaced Constitution as the arbiter of judicial decisions,"' 2 and, since the definition
of a "consensus" is always biased in favor of socially dominant
groups, this in effect ignored the just demands of less favored
groups. Thus we have the perpetuation of "unequal justice."
II
Perhaps my central frustration with Auerbach's argument
comes from the ambiguity latent in the above quoted comment. He
veers back and forth between a "liberal" position and a "radical"
one, without always recognizing that they cut in fundamentally
different directions.
The "liberal" position contains the basic premise that the Constitution establishes a fundamentally decent vision of the polity.
The problem is either that the Constitution is ignored (in the name
of "consensus") or that certain groups are deprived of their constitutional rights because of breakdowns in the legal market which result
in insufficient access to the lawyers who otherwise could vindicate
their rights. A "liberal" analysis thus almost always concentrates on
problems of access and defines inequality in terms of insufficient
supply of an artificially scarce good-lawyers. Lawyers, acting in
accordance with their "professional" norms, thereby will help to
establish the "rule of law," which is roughly synonymous with a
decent society.
The "radical" position, on the other hand, holds that the polity
always will be dominated by those groups with the closest ties to the
ownership and control of the essential economic means of production. A class will try to establish its hegemony over the society in
11. Id. at 187.
12.

Id. at 259.

1492

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1487

part by clothing its class-specific interests within the universalist
rhetoric of "law," but the substantive content of the law always will
reflect the interests of the dominant class. Therefore, from this
perspective, the problem of access is relatively unimportant, for the
legal system is fundamentally biased against the disfavored classes.
Change in the legal system can come only after fundamental change
3
in the external society.'
Auerbach often plays on our continued receptivity to the rhetoric of "liberalism." His reference to the presumed strength of "the
Constitution" is one example. Elsewhere he is critical of the Bar
during World War I for being "unaware that their patriotism intruded upon their professional obligations" to defend unpopular
persons.'4 Similarly, he argues that the Bar failed during the Cold
War to live up to its "special responsibilities-to promote the administration of justice and to provide equal justice under law." As
a result of this failure, he asserts, "the legal and judicial processes
tilted toward 'political justice': the use of legal procedures for political ends." 1 5 I certainly do not mean to suggest that Auerbach is
"wrong" in his descriptions, but I would argue that only a "liberal"
can be surprised that the legal system is one of "political justice"
or suggest that reinvigoration of "the Constitution" would help resolve fundamental social problems.
Auerbach is not naive, and he exhibits awareness of the extent
to which the legal system simply reflects many of the structural
inequalities in American society. He similarly recognizes that access
alone will not resolve the problems of inequality so long as the
substantive law emphasizes the interests of specific classes or
groups. Nevertheless, he seems to believe that the answer to classbiased justice is recourse to the "public interest" as the test for
substantive law.'" There is no widespread agreement, however, on
what constitutes such "public interest." Auerbach again echoes the
American past, particularly the Progressive movement with its
emphasis on the public good.
Again, though, it is this very emphasis on "commonality" that
is attacked by a "radical" analysis, with its contrary focus on fundamental conflict as the social norm, and thus the necessity to choose
13.
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forthrightly which class will be allowed to dominate the others
through the aegis of the legal system. According to this analysis, the
prerequisite for a legal system structured around the "common interest" is the elimination of social class entirely and the rule by a
single universal class. In any case, recourse to "professionalism,"
the "rule of law," or "the Constitution" would be equally rejected
as extremely limited solutions.
I do not mean to argue that the "radical" analysis is necessarily
correct or the "liberal" approach necessarily wrong. I do mean to
suggest that it is confusing to combine them within a single critique
of the American legal system. It is probably true, given the nature
of American society, that attempts at reform are best couched
within "traditional" American rhetoric like "the Constitution" and
"rule of law." Nonetheless, if our primary concern is intellectual
analysis, such rhetoric may be less than helpful. The notion of "rule
of law" is derived from an entire pre-eighteenth century intellectual
framework within which "law" was generated by abstract principles
of reason and justice and "discovered" by lawyers and judges using
the "artificial reason" of the law. 7 It is not clear that we can continue to use the eighteenth-century language unless we share the
assumptions underlying the language, and I would argue that the
overwhelming majority of us do not share those assumptions.'" In
addition, one can certainly question the extent to which "the Constitution" speaks with clear and unequivocal meaning. If it does
not, then what exactly would fidelity to the Constitution entail? 9
Auerbach has brought much valuable information to our attention. He has raised a variety of important questions. He lets us
down, however, in his suggestions of answers to these questions by
failing to make more precise arguments and failing to recognize
some of the ideological tensions within his own approach. One hopes
that he will return to the questions and will participate in the important debate that his book should help to generate.
17. See Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law,
1780-1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HisToRY 287 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
18. For an elaboration of this argument see Levinson, Fidelity to Law and the Assessment of PoliticalActivity (Or, Can a War CriminalBe a GreatMan?), 27 STAN. L. REv. 1185,
1194-97 (1975).
19.

For a brilliant examination of this problem see P. BREST, PROCESSES
(1975).

TIONAL DECISIONMAKING

OF

CONsTIrU-

